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In the early 1980's the direct broadcast satellite
service ("DBS") I was envisioned both as a revolu-
tion for the nation's television screens and as a
technical curiosity that would forever supplement
cable television in areas where cable could not
reach.2 Today, with names such as DirecTV3 and
I DBS is a non-broadcast video service in which satellites
beam television signals back to earth using high-powered
transponders (transmitters) that allow the use of small size
satellite receiving antennas (dishes). See DANIEL L. BRENNER,
MONROE E. PRICE AND MICHAEL I. MEVERSON, 2 CABLE TELEVI-
SION AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO § 15.01 (April 1998)
[hereinafter Nonbroadcast Video]; c.f, Satellite Communications/
Direct Broadcast Satellites Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecom., Consumer Protect., and Finance, 97 th Cong. 97-81 (Tes-
timony of Stanley S. Hubbard, President, United States Satel-
lite Brdcstng. Co.)(Dec. 15, 1981) The current "players" in
DBS include DirecTV and USSB, which are licensed at 1010
West Longitude (W.L.), EchoStar (Dish Network) licensed at
1190 and 61.50 W.L., Continental and Dominion Video Satel-
lite are licensed, but have not launched their satellites at
61.50 and 1660 W.L. . Tempo Satellite launched a satellite at
1190 W.L. in March of 1996 and an outstanding authoriza-
tion at 1660 W.L. , but has yet to offer service. See Annual
Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Fourth Annual Report, 13 FCC
Rcd. 1034, paras. 54-67 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 Competition
Report].
2 See Development of Regulatory Policy in Regard to Di-
rect Broadcast Satellites for the Period Following the 1983
Regional Administrative Radio Conference, Report and Order,
90 F.C.C. 2d 676 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 DBS Order] (stat-
ing that the DBS service "holds the unique promise of meet-
ing the programming needs of the underserved"). The
surveys and estimates in the 1980's believed that if the DBS
service launched in 1986 as anticipated, that DBS would serve
a limited audience with a subscribership would top out at
around 5 million homes after 8 years of the service's exist-
ence. Most estimates at the time placed the total potential
audience somewhere between 3 and 9 million subscribers. See
John P. Taylor, "DBS Service Still Long Way Off Despite FCC
Permits," TELEWISION/RADio AGE, Oct. 18, 1982 at 37. Ironi-
cally, the latest FCC survey indicated that there were 7.2 mil-
lion DBS subscribers at the end of 1997. See In re Policies and
Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, 13 FCC Rcd.
6907, n.2 (1998); and 1997 Competition Report, supra note 1.
Testimony before Congress in the 1980's was pessimistic
about DBS. The Commission stated in the 1982 DBS Order
Dish Network4 becoming ubiquitous, DBS's fu-
ture is assured. It has made one of the most suc-
cessful debuts in consumer electronic history,5
with industry analysts touting that in the short pe-
riod between the service's inauguration in 1994 to
present,6 DBS has acquired over 9 million sub-
that DBS would remedy the lack of commercial television in
rural areas. One witness before Congress disputed this asser-
tion, testifying that DBS reception would be problematic and
that it would serve a non-existent consumer demand for en-
tertainment sources (citing that video cassettes and discs,
among other media, would more easily satisfy this demand).
See Satellite Communications/Direct Broadcast Satellites Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Telecom., Consumer Protect., and Finance,
97th Cong. 100-103 (statement of Wallace J. Jorgenson, As-
soc. of Maximum Service Telecasters and the Three Televi-
sion Network Affiliates Associations). He argued that DBS is
not local, is subject to various technical limitations and would
place control of the national television medium in the hands
of the few. See id.; and 1982 DBS Order at para. 32. Other testi-
mony supported the Commission's prediction that DBS
would bring video service to the "tens of millions of homes"
that would be unlikely to ever receive terrestrial video service
and that DBS would inject a much needed element of com-
petition into the MVPD market. See Satellite Communications!
Direct Broadcast Satellites Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecom., Consumer Protect., and Finance, 97th Cong. 97-81
(Testimony of Irving Goldstein, President, Satellite Televi-
sion Corp.) (Dec 15, 1981) (quoting Notice of Proposed Policy
Statement and Rulemaking, Gen. Docket No. 80-603, 86
F.C.C.2d at 728).
3 DirecTV is an affiliate of Hughes Electronics, a division
of General Motors. See Hughes Elec. Corp., 1996 Annual Re-
port (1998) [hereinafter Hughes Annual Report].
4 Dish Network is the trade name for EchoStar Commu-
nications, based out of Littleton, Colorado. See EchoStar Sat-
ellite Brdcstng. Corp. (Disclosure Inc., ed. 1998) [hereinafter
EchoStar Satellite Report].
5 See Cable T. V. Competition: Testimony Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition of the Senate Comm.
On the Judiciary (Testimony of Leo J. Hindery, Jr., President
of Tele-Communications, Inc.) 1997 WL 631202 (Oct. 8,
1997) ("In the last year alone, DBS added 2.7 million new cus-
tomers, an astounding annual growth rate of 85%. In fact, it
has been reported that DBS had 'the most successful launch
of a major product in consumer electronics history."').
6 DirecTV/USSB began service in 1994, EchoStar
launched the DISH Network on March 4, 1996. See Hughes
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Since 1982, the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC" or "Commission") has regulated
DBS as an experimental service8 because of
problems with financing and marketing DBS as
well as technical challenges.9 The Commission de-
cided that it would be best to let the industry de-
cide how to use the technology. 10 This policy of
regulatory flexibility and experimental status con-
tinues to this day.11
In February of 1998, the Commission issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM"). In re
Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satel-
lite Service1 2 proposed to finalize the rules for
DBS by moving separately established regulations
in Part 100 of the Commission's rules into the reg-
ulatory scheme of the domestic satellite service
("DOMSAT") in Part 25.13
The NPRA44 also solicited public comment on
several important policy questions, specifically:
(1) the existence and modification of the rules on
foreign ownership of DBS, (2) the possible
strengthening of the existing rules involving ser-
vice to Alaska and Hawaii; and, (3) whether the
Commission should promulgate new rules to ad-
dress the horizontal concentration of multi-chan-
nel video programming ("MVPD"), in the form of
the prohibition of cable/DBS crossownership.' 5
These proposals were contested by the commenta-
tors.16
Addressing horizontal concentration in the
NPRM, the Commission sought comment on
whether it should continue to address competitive
and public interest issues on a case-by-case basis
or adopt some form of MVPD/DBS crossowner-
ship rule.1 7 The FCC asserted that continuing to
address competition concerns on a case-by-case
basis would continue a "longstanding commit-
ment" to DBS regulatory flexibility and would not
hinder the Commission's ability to address spe-
cific cases on the facts in existence at the time.' 8
However, a formal rule would provide "greater
predictability and consistency" and avoid the costs
to the applicant and Commission of addressing
specific questions on an individual basis in licens-
ing proceedings. 19
This Comment first discusses the Commission's
concurrent power to regulate competition in the
communications industry. This Comment will
then examine the predicate for the Commission's
establishment of a cable/DBS crossownership
prohibition. Next, this Comment analyzes the ar-
guments against imposing a blanket ownership re-
striction, focusing on the concerns raised by the
parties in the NPRM. Finally, this Comment advo-
cates that the Commission continue to analyze
DBS ownership on a case-by-case basis, but with a
heightened degree of scrutiny.
Annual Report, supra note 3; and EchoStar Satellite Report, supra
note 4.
7 See Satellite Industry Optimistic Despite Market, Launch Fail-
ures, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 5, 1998. (Satellite TV subscriber
totals reaching 9.6 million at the end of August 1998); See e.g.
DBS, CABLEFAX, Sept. 9, 1998. (DirecTV acquires subscriber 4
million and has acquired roughly 1 million subscribers a
year; up nearly 30% from last year); and DirecTV Activates 4
Millionth Subscriber, BUSINESSWIRE, Sept. 17, 1998.
8 See 1982 DBS Order, supra note 2; and see generally Non-
broadcast Video, supra note 1 at §§ 15.03 & 15.06 (Rel. # 11
1997) (providing detailed account of the history, develop-
ment and regulation of the DBS service). The Commission
was given explicit authority to regulate DBS by section 205 of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See 47 U.S.C.A. 303 (v)
(West Supp. 1998).
9 See No Big Surprise: 5d Major Player Bails Out of DBS, Cit-
ing Immature Market, COMM. DAILY, July 11, 1984 at 1. Two of
the three major potential DBS entrants were Comsat and
Western Union. Id.
10 See 1982 DBS Order, supra note 2; see also National Assoc.
of Broad. v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Up-
holding the 1982 Order and stating that Commission has the
authority to approve services on an experimental basis in an
effort to gather important market data to complete a regula-
tory framework).
1 1 In re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satel-
lite Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 6907,
paras. 5-8 (1998) [hereinafter NPRM or Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking].
12 13 FCC Rcd. 6907 (1998).
13 See id. at para. 2. (stating that the Commission has his-
torically regulated DBS and DTH-FSS (direct-to-home fixed
satellite service), which is transmitted using fixed-satellite ser-
vice (FSS) frequency bands separately.) The Commissions
rule for the DBS service are codified in Part 100, while FSS
rules, including those applicable to DTH satellite service
providers, can be found in Part 25. See 47 C.F.R. § 25.101 et.
seq. (1998); and 47 C.F.R. 100.1 et seq. (1998); see e.g. Non-
broadcast Video, supra, note 8 at § 15.07.
14 See NPRM, supra note 11.
15 See id. at paras. 20-21, 32-36, 54-59.
16 See generally Commenters Support Case-by-Case Review of
Cable Ownership of DBS, COMM. DAILY (April 8, 1998).
17 See id. at para. 59.
18 See id.
19 See id.
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I. REGULATING DBS IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
A. The FCC's Shared Authority to Regulate
Competition
The FCC shares responsibility for the oversight
of competition in the communications industry
with the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission.20 The FCC's oversight is de-
rived from its statutory obligation to grant
licenses, to regulate, and to create policy. 21 The
Commission considers the competitive effects of a
grant or transfer of a license as a factor in deter-
mining whether the transaction will be in the
"public interest, convenience and necessity."22
B. Scarcity, the Public Interest and Diversity
1. Scarcity as the Basis of Commission Regulation
The conceptual foundation for the FCC's regu-
lation of radio frequencies can be traced to the
scarcity doctrine.23 This doctrine is founded on
the numerical limit on licenses and the limited
nature of the radio frequency spectrum.24
The Commission's regulatory power has been
justified on this doctrine in several landmark
20 See James R. Weiss and Martin L. Stern, Serving Two
Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the FCC and the Department of
Justice Over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 CoMMLaw CoN-
SPECTUS 195, 196 (Summer 1998) [hereinafter Two Masters].
Weiss and Stem concentrated on the Department of Justice
("DOJ") and FCC combined jurisdictions because "virtually
all telecommunications mergers" are within the jurisdiction
of both the FCC and the DOJ. Id. Their thesis is that the
Commission is subject to public scrutiny and political pres-
sure in making competitive decisions which the DOJ, as an
enforcement agency, is not. Id. This difference in character,
with the FCC as a broad prospective policy-making body and
the DOJ as a narrow retrospective enforcement body, creates
inefficiencies and wildly fluctuating results under the two
agencies' disparate analysis. Id.
21 See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 301 & 308 (West Supp. 1998). See
also Two Masters, supra note 20 at 197-198 (noting that the
Commission has an express grant of power under the Clay-
ton Antitrust Act for enforcement in the area of wire and
radio communication, but that the FCC is limited to adminis-
trative antitrust proceedings. Therefore, it often chooses not
to use this explicit grant of authority). The Commission cites
section 310 (d) as its basis for its competitive analysis. See 47
U.S.C. § 310 (d) (West Supp. 1998); and In re Application of
Motorola, Inc. and American Mobile Sat. Corp. for Consent
to Transfer Control of Ardis Company, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 5182 (1998) (adopting a formal com-
petitive analysis in satellite regulation for the first time). Sec-
tion 310 (d) states that no permit or license can be trans-
ferred, assigned, or disposed of by transfer of control except
upon the Commission's finding that the public interest, con-
cases, notably Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.25
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court upheld the Com-
mission's Fairness Doctrine that mandated broad-
casters air opposing viewpoints on community is-
sues. 26 While Red Lion is primarily viewed as a
content regulation case, it is also cited for the
Court's justification of the need to limit the use of
the spectrum by licensing. 27 The Court equated
broadcasting with two persons speaking at the
same time.28 That is, if both spoke at once noth-
ing would be understood by either. 29 The limited
nature of the spectrum imposed a duty upon the
Commission to ensure that licensees would bene-
fit the public at large. 30 Notwithstanding the ex-
press authority to regulate particular services in
the Communications Act of 1934,31 the general
duty to license in the public interest provides the
Commission broad discretion to regulate the
qualifications and actions of licensees.3 2
2. The Public Interest: Intertwining Competition and
Diversity.
The Commission's interpretation of the public
interest includes the related principles of compe-
tition and diversity.33 Promotion of competition
venience, and necessity will be served. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 310
(West Supp. 1998).
22 See id.; and Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28
(D.C. Cir. 1950) (upholding the denial of a grant of a broad-
cast license to a newspaper on finding the "intent and prac-
tice of suppressing competition"). Id. at 35. The court stated
that Congress' creation of policy and criminal penalties
against monopoly does not preclude an administrative
agency charged with furthering the public interest from
holding the general policy of Congress to be applicable. Id. at
33.
23 See Bethany M. Bums, Comment, Reforming the Newspa-
per Industry: Achieving First Amendment Goals of Diversity
Through Structural Regulation, 5 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 61, 69
(Winter 1997) (proposing that media concentration should
be the touchstone for preserving the First Amendment
through regulation of the broadcast and print me-
dia) [hereafter Achieving First Amendment Goals].
24 See id.
25 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
26 See id. at 373-75.
27 See id. at 375-76 & 396-97.
28 See id. at 388-89.
29 See id. at 387-88.
30 See 395 U.S. at 389-90.
31 Communications Act of 1934, c. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
(1934) (codified, as amended, at 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.).
32 See id. at 376-77.
33 See Benjamin A. Compaine, The Impact of Ownership on
Content: Does it Matter?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & Er. L.J. 755, 761
(1995) [hereinafter Impact of Ownership on Content] (positing
1999]
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will result in the diversity of content. 34 The Com-
mission attempts to further encourage diversity by
redefining licensing standards35 or through pro-
moting competition by limiting the number or
type of licenses that may be held by an entity. 36
In National Citizens Committee v. FCC,37 the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that it was
impermissible for the Commission to use its li-
censing authority to promote diversity in the com-
munications industry because, "[t]his argument
undersells the Commission's power to regulate
broadcasting in the 'public interest. '"' 38 The
Court asserted that the Commission had the statu-
tory authority to make rules based on a policy of
promoting diversity of ownership. 39
C. The Commission's Available Choices of
Protecting the Public Interest in DBS
Ownership
The Commission has three options in formulat-
that the Commission's policies designed to increase view-
point diversity through market structure regulation will con-
tinue to be ineffective).
34 See id.
35 For a discussion of the Commission's efforts to in-
crease license ownership by the implementation of racially
preferential licensing standards, see Mary Tabor, Encouraging
"Those Who Would Speak Out with Fresh Voice" Through the Federal
Communications Commission's Minority Ownership Policies, 76
IOWA L. REv. 609 (March 1991) (arguing that the Commis-
sion's attempts to increase minority participation have
failed).
36 See Impact of Ownership on Content, supra note 33 at 762.
37 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
775 (1978).
38 See id. The Supreme Court has been described as en-
couraging the Commission to exercise a Congressionally
mandated goal of diversity. See Achieving First Amendment
Goals, supra note 23 at 69. In turn the Commission is said to
have been "very clear" about the great lengths it will go to
accomplish the maximum diversity of ownership that the
technology will permit. See Impact of Ownership, supra note 33
at 761.
39 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at
794. The Court noted that it had sustained the Commission's
multiple ownership rules in U. S. v. Storer Broad. , 351 U.S.
192, 203 (1956); and National Broad. Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190
(1943).
40 See NPRM, supra note 11 at para. 58 & 61.
41 See id.
42 See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
13,104 (1992), 57 FR 41, 552 (Sept. 10, 1992), 1992 FTC
LEXIS 176 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines]. The
Commission has hinted that it may take this approach. See
NPRM, supra note 11 at paras. 59-61.
43 The concerns about the concentration of electronic
media ownership are far from new. In 1924, President Calvin
ing the final DBS ownership rules to further the
public interest in diversity of ownership. First, it
may promulgate a blanket rule.40 Second, it may
continue an ad hoc approach to determining
whether the granting of a DBS license serves the
public interest.41 Third, the Commission can
adopt a formal antitrust/competition analysis. 42
II. A BLANKET DBS/CABLE OWNERSHIP
PROHIBITION
Blanket ownership restrictions have long been a
regulatory tool for the Commission.43 The Com-
mission will use a blanket prohibition whenever it
believes that the public interest will be best served
by a "diversification of control of the media of
mass communications."4 4 Examples include: (1)
the Commission's 1975 restrictions on newspaper
ownership of in-market broadcast properties; 45
and (2) the prohibition of cable operator owner-
ship of Local Multipoint Distribution Service
Coolidge warned that concentration of radio in the hands of
the few was especially insidious because of the limited and
exclusive right of broadcasters to use the radio spectrum. See
Jonathan W. Emord, The First Amendment Invalidity of FCC
Ownership Regulations, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 405 (Winter
1989) [hereinafter First Amendment Invalidity]. Since the
1940's, the FCC has promulgated rules limiting the number
of broadcast stations an entity could own. See FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broad , 436 U.S. 775 (1978). The case
presents a concise summary of the ownership restrictions the
Commission placed on radio. The Supreme Court cites Mul-
tiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Station, 8 Fed. Reg.
16065 (1943); and Rules and Regulations Governing Televi-
sion Broadcast Groups, 6 Fed. Reg. 2284, 2284-2285 (1943);
The Court traces the early ownership restrictions from the
early days of AM radio, to the regulations prohibiting the
ownership of more than one broadcast network, to the news-
paper/broadcasting cross-ownership prohibitions. Id. at 780-
782 & 781, nn. 1-3. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad.
upheld the Commission's newspaper/broadcast crossowner-
ship restrictions, which are still in effect. See 436 U.S. 775
(1978); and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (d) (1998).
44 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at
781. The Commission has historically balanced this concern
for diversity of control as "a factor of primary significance"
against the Commission's sometimes-conflicting goal of en-
suring "the best practicable service to the public." Id. at 781-
82. Because of this, a waiver provision was included in the
regulation, which often allowed newspaper owners to hold
licenses for stations in their community of license if they
demonstrated that they were the only party that could pro-
vide the best service. Id. at 782-783; and see 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555, n. 4 (1998).
45 See In re Amendment of Sections 73.35, 73.240, and
73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Own-
ership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 47 F.C.C.2d 97 (1974); and
FCC v. National Citizens, 436 U.S. at 783-789.
(Vol. 7
Preserving the Public Interest
licenses ("LMDS") .46
A. The Newspaper/Broadcast Crossownership
Restrictions
The prohibition on newspaper/broadcast cross-
ownership remains in effect. 47 The rule prohibits
newspaper owners from acquiring a broadcast sta-
tion in the same market area.48 Broadcast owners
seeking to buy a newspaper in their market are
required to divest their broadcast holdings within
a one year period. 49 The Commission reasoned
the crossownership prohibitions were consistent
with the spirit of the First Amendment by preserv-
ing the public interest in independent informa-
tion sources because newspapers and television
were consumers' primary source of news. The
mandatory divestment provisions that accompa-
nied the ownership prohibition addressed anti-
trust concerns.
50
The Supreme Court upheld the newspaper/
broadcast ownership prohibition in FCC v. Na-
tional Citizens Committee for Broadcasting.51  The
Court concluded that antitrust considerations
alone would prevent the public interest from be-
ing met.52 For example, in any given area, the ac-
quisition of a broadcast station by a newspaper
46 See In Re Rulemaking to Amend Parts 1,2,21, and 25 of
the Commission's Rule to Redesignate the 27.5-29.5 GHz Fre-
quency Band, to Establish Rules and Policies for Local Multi-
point Distribution Service and for Fixed Satellite Services, Sec-
ond Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 12545 (1997) [hereinafter
LMDS Order]. LMDS can provide a broad range of wireless
services. See id. at paras. 205 & 207. It can provide one way
and two way data and voice communications. See id. LMDS
can also be used to supply multi-channel video service to sub-
scribers. See id. at para. 213. Unlike cable, LMDS can carry
video on a common carrier basis as an open video system. See
id. at para. 217.
47 See First Amendment Invalidity, supra note 43 at 416-417;
and 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (c) (1998).
48 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1998).
49 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at
785, n. 8; and see 47 C.F.R § 73.3555 (1998).
50 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at
783 & 785. The Commission established these policies de-
spite the contradictory, inconclusive testimony and the lack
of evidence of specific competitive abuses. See id. at 786.
51 See id.
52 See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at
796.
53 See id. (quoting dicta in United States v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 358 U.S. 334, 351-352 (1959)).
54 See id. at 799-802. The First Amendment arguments
publisher could create a mass media monopoly.53
The Court rejected arguments that the ownership
restrictions infringed on free speech. 54
B. The LMDS/Cable Crossownership
Restrictions.
Recently, the Commission enacted a crossown-
ership prohibition in the Local Multi-point Distri-
bution Service. 55 The FCC believed that against
the background of the Primestar cases,5 6 cable op-
erator entry into LMDS would lead to the acquisi-
tion of licenses for the purpose of preventing
market entry by others. 5 7
Mindful of that possibility, the Commission pro-
hibited local exchange carriers or incumbent
cable companies from acquiring a LMDS license
in their service or cable franchise areas or in areas
that significantly overlap their franchise area.58
The rule contained a waiver provision as well as a
"sunset" provision.5 9
These restrictions were upheld in Melcher v.
FCC.60 Melcher and others were LMDS license ap-
plicants who challenged the FCC ownership re-
strictions6 1 because they believed a cable owner-
ship in LMDS would result in increased, rather
than decreased, competition for cable. 62
against blanket crossownership bans are discussed below in
section III (A).
55 See LMDS Order, supra note 46. The MMDS (wireless
cable) service has a statutory provision that is a "blanket"
cable/local exchange carrier cross-ownership provision, put
in place by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The LDMS
Orderwas affirmed by Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143 (D.C. Cir.
1998). LMDS is a wireless service that can provide one or two
way fixed video, voice, and data services. LMDS licenses are
versatile and can be used to provide service in the local
MVPD market, the local telephone market, a broadband data
market, or a combination of these services. Id. at para. 170.
56 See discussion infra. Part III.D.2.a.
57 See id. at 169. The Commission licenses LMDS in 493
geographical service areas defined as BTAs. See LMDS Order,
supra note 46 at paras. 126 & 135.
58 See 47 C.F.R. § 101.1003(a) (1998).
59 See 47 C.F.R § 101.1003 (a)(1) (1998). The provision
automatically expires ("sunsets") three years after June 30,
1997 unless it is extended by the Commission. Id.
60 See Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
61 See id.
62 See id. Melcher argued that there was a lack of evi-
dence that an entity would use its licenses primarily to block
entry into an MVPD market. See id.
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III. CHALLENGING A BLANKET DBS/CABLE
CROSSOWNERSHIP PROHIBITION
A. The First Amendment
1. The First Amendment as a Barrier to Spectrum
Regulation
A commentator to the NPRM asserted that en-
acting a prospective blanket crossownership ban
offends the First Amendment.63 In similar cases
presenting similar arguments, the Supreme Court
has resoundly rejected these contentions.64
In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,65 the Court con-
cluded broadcasters cannot receive absolute First
Amendment protection because the limited spec-
trum cannot accommodate all individuals who
wish to broadcast over it.66 Thus, the Court rea-
soned it would be impractical to find an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broad-
cast.6 7 The Court asserted that no one has a First
Amendment right to monopolize the radio fre-
quencies. 68 Therefore, a denial of a license on
public interest concerns cannot be equated with
the denial of free speech.69
2. The First Amendment as Barrier to Competition
Regulation
Just as the denial of a license in the public inter-
63 See Comments of Time Warner Cable to In re Policies
and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-
26 at 7-8 (April 6, 1998); and Reply Comments of Time
Warner Cable to In re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broad-
cast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at 9-10; but see Reply Com-
ments of EchoStar Communications Corp. to In re Policies
and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-
26 at 7-8 (April 22, 1998).
64 See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); and
National Broad. Co. v FCC, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
65 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (uphold-
ing the personal attack provisions that required a station who
broadcast a personal attack to furnish the person attacked
with a tape, transcript or summary of the broadcast and time
for a response).
66 See id. at 388-89.
67 See id. at 389. It stated that "it would be strange if the
First Amendment, aimed at protecting and furthering com-
munications, prevented the Government from making radio
communication possible by requiring licenses to broadcast
and by limiting the number of licenses so as not to overcrowd
the spectrum." See id.
68 See id.
69 See id. (quoting National Broad. Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S.
190).
70 See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
(1969) (affirming the judgment that a joint operating agree-
est does not offend the First Amendment, it is not
a barrier to licensing and regulating broadcasting,
and it does not provide a sanctuary for anticompe-
titive behavior. In Citizen Publishing Co. v. U.S.70
and Associated Press v. U.S.,71 the Supreme Court
clarified that the First Amendment is a powerful
reason for antitrust enforcement. 72 The Court as-
serted that the First Amendment rests on the as-
sumption that diverse viewpoints are essential to
the public welfare because the freedom to publish
is guaranteed. 73 Nevertheless, the freedom to
combine and keep others from publishing is not
guaranteed.7 4
Recently, in Sunbelt Television v. Jones Intercable,75
a district court noted that the Supreme Court
consistently finds media antitrust defendants not
immune from suit if their activities are guided by
anti-competitive motives. 76 The court, citing Lo-
rain Journal v. U.S., 77 determined the First Amend-
ment is not a cloak for activities that destroy the
competitive marketplace. 78 The court reasoned
the goal of protecting the competitive market-
place is a factor that should be considered in the
First Amendment jurisprudence. 79 Thus, the First
Amendment protects competition that would re-
sult from free speech. From this perspective, the
First Amendment is not a barrier to establishing a
crossownership prohibition in DBS.
ment between two daily newspapers violates the Sherman An-
titrust Act).
71 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (up-
holding summary judgment in favor of the Government en-
joining the Associated Press prevention of dissemination of
news by members to non-members).
72 See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. at
139-40 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at
20).
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See Sunbelt Television v. Jones Intercable, 795 F. Supp. 333
(C.D. Ca. 1992) (denying motion to dismiss in a civil monop-
oly action by a TV station against a cable system which re-
fused to carry the signal).
76 See id. at 335.
77 See id. at 336, (quoting LorainJournal v. U.S., 342 U.S.
143, 155 (1951) (holding that the First Amendment does not
protect anti-competitive advertising practices by newspa-
per)).
78 See Sunbelt TV v. Jones Intercable, 795 F. Supp. at 336
(finding that antitrust laws only incidentally restrict speech).
79 See id. The court goes on to state that "the Sherman
Act interferes only with those decision-makers who them-
selves seek to muzzle the marketplace of ideas... the First
Amendment will not safeguard, nor should it, anti-competi-
tive program decisions." Id.
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3. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC: Some Regulations
Offend the First Amendment
Commentator Time Warner Cable cites Turner
Broadcasting System v. FCC0° for the proposition
that any regulation promulgated by the Commis-
sion implicating the First Amendment would not
pass intermediate scrutiny.81 The Turner court in-
validated regulations mandating cable carriage of
certain television stations.8 2 It found that there
was not enough evidence on the record to indi-
cate that broadcast stations were in financial
trouble or in need of protection or that a blanket
rule was the least restrictive means available.8 3
Time Warner correctly stated that the United
States v. O'Brien84 First Amendment test would sus-
tain a content-restrictive regulation, but only if it
furthered an important governmental interest
and only incidentally infringed the First Amend-
ment.8 5 However, the application of Turner to
DBS is a misreading of the Court's holding be-
cause the proper standard for review of DBS own-
ership regulation is to examine whether the own-
ership qualifications would assure that the DBS
licenses granted are in the public interest.
This public interest takes DBS beyond the pa-
rameters of O'Brien§6 and Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem and places it under the deferential review ac-
corded in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting.8 7 The Turner Broadcasting System
court refused to apply the National Citizens Commit-
tee line of reasoning because cable does not fall
into the unique physical limitations of broadcast-
80 See Comments of Time Warner Cable to In re Policies
and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-
26 at 7. [hereinafter Comments of Time Warner Cable]; Turner
Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (challenging the "must
carry" provisions of the 1992 Cable TV Act).
81 See Comments of Time Warner Cable, supra note 80 at
7 (stating that the Supreme Court has "unequivocally held"
that cable operators engage in speech and are entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment and that a complete
cable/DBS cross-ownership ban could not withstand any
legal standard of scrutiny under the First Amendment).
82 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 667-68.
83 See id.
84 See Comments of Time Warner, supra note 80 at 7.
(quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (stating that a regulation that incidentally infringes
upon the First Amendment will be upheld as along as it is the
least burdensome alternative)).
85 See Turner Broad. Sys. at 662 (quoting U.S. v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377).
86 See U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367.
87 See Ameritech Corp. v U.S., 867 F. Supp. 721, 729-731
(N.D. Ill. 1994).
ing supported by the "scarcity" rationale applied
in National Citizens Committee.8 As the court stated
in Ameritech Corp. v. FCC,s9 a scarcity rationale may
or may not be necessary to support a crossowner-
ship rule, however, it is a necessary prerequisite to
application of rational basis scrutiny under Na-
tional Citizens Committee."°
In further support of its position, Time Warner
offers Daniels Cablevision v. U.S. 91 The Daniels
court invalidated a provision of the 1992 Cable
Act directing the Commission to set limits on the
number of cable subscribers a cable operator can
reach through cable systems it owns or has an in-
terest.92
The Daniels court was troubled by the statutory
restraints on subscribership because the limits
precluded a cable system from attempting to serve
more subscribers in its service area.93 The rules
set a cap that once reached, would require the
cable system to deny service to willing subscrib-
ers.94 In declaring the cap unconstitutional,
which would have profoundly affected cable sys-
tem revenues, the court asserted that "[t]he First
Amendment protects the right of every citizen to
reach the minds of any willing listeners. . .95 Un-
like in Daniels, the denial of a DBS license to a
cable operator would not leave the operator "with
absolutely no intra-medium means of speaking to
the remainder of its potential audience."96 The
denial does not eliminate the cable system from
attracting more potential subscribers in the cable
service area.97
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 730. The court in Ameritech makes it clear that
the "economic characteristics of the broadcast market" is not
the underlying basis for the broadcast regulation cases, but
rather the "special physical characteristics of the medium."
Id. at 730-731. Stating that the "Supreme Court made clear"
in Turner Broadcasting that "such a 'market dysfunction' ra-
tionale was not at the root of the broadcast regulation
cases ... " Id. at 731 (citing Turner Brdcstng. Sys. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 682).
91 See Daniels Cablevision v. US., 835 F. Supp. I (D.D.C.
1993) (holding in part that FCC-established subscriber limits
violate the First Amendment).
92 See id. at 10; See Cable Act of 1992 § 613 (f), Pub. L.
No. 102-385 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 533 (1998).
93 See Daniels Cablevision v. U.S., 835 F. Supp. at 10.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 See Daniels Cablevision v. U.S., 835 F. Supp. at 10.
97 See id. A cable system could lower its rates, improve its
service, add more attractive programming or engage in a
more effective advertising campaign. Id.
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B. Alleging DBS Lacks the Necessary Scarcity
The scarcity rationale articulated in Red Lion v.
FC0C8 is based on the premise that radio broad-
casting was more susceptible to reality of interfer-
ence created by multiple speakers.9 9 For example,
until the establishment of the Federal Radio Com-
mission in 1927,100 each operator chose the fre-
quency on which he would broadcast. 0 1 The re-
sult was chaos.' 0 2 The Radio Act of 1927 and the
Communications Act of 1934 restored order to
the airwaves. 0 3 Regulations that limit the use of
radio frequencies are necessary to avoid a return
to airwave anarchy.10 4 Therefore, the concept of
scarcity is not likely to disappear from radio regu-
lation.
However, because broadcast regulation is pre-
mised on the scarcity concept, if scarcity does not
exist in a particular situation the regulation will
be invalidated. 105 A DBS ownership restriction
could be attacked by refuting the existence of
scarcity.
1. The Presence of Other Competitive Media Means
DBS is Not Scarce
Critics of DBS ownership restrictions assert that
98 See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 367-76.
99 See id.
100 , See id. at 375-376; and Michael F. Finn, The Public Inter-
est and Bell Entry into Long-Distance Under Section 271 of the Com-
munications Act, 5 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 193, 207 (Summer
1997) [hereinafter The Public Interest].
101 See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 375.
102 See id.
103 See The Public Interest, supra note 100 at 207. The Red
Lion Court, in footnote five quotes one of the Radio Act's
sponsors who stated that the right of all Americans to enjoy
radio communication can only be preserved only by the re-
pudiation of the idea that anyone who wishes to transmit may
transmit and replacing it with the assertion that the right of
the public to service is superior to the right to any individual.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 376, n 5.
104 See id. at 375-76.
105 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 682 (1994).
106 See 1997 Video Competition Report, supra note 1 at
paras. 71-89 & 97-102.
107 See id. The consumer's choices outside DBS or cable
would include a satellite master antenna television system
("SMATV"), a wireless cable system like "LMDS", as well as
"cable" delivered by one's telephone company or over the
Internet. See id.
108 This argument is also belied by participant behavior
in the last auction period and in the Primestar licensing pro-
ceedings. If the availability of spectrum and orbital positions
were not scarce, then the value of a license would arguably be
less than prices that have been paid at auction. See NAB At-
tack on Satellite TV Won't Hurt DBS Growth, Investors Say,
because the Commission has broadly defined the
relevant competitive marketplace for DBS as the
multi-channel video programming distribution
market scarcity is not present in DBS. 10 6 This defi-
nition assumes that the American consumer could
ideally choose to watch MTV, CNN or ESPN by
subscribing to one of a number of choices outside
cable and DBS.10 7 However, alternative choices to
DBS are irrelevant to the concept of licensing.10 s
Further, while DBS is a MVPD system, it is a
broadcast medium with regulatory and perform-
ance characteristics different than those of cable.
The Commission's licensing process is con-
cerned more with the method of information de-
livery to the home rather than the media's con-
tent.109 As such, the Commission's duty to protect
the pubic interest makes ownership concentration
of licenses an overriding concern. 110
Like radio and television broadcasting, DBS has
two constant scarcities: spectrum11' and satellite
orbital positions.' 12 One commentator noted that
the Commission's DISCO Idecision"13 allows enti-
ties to avail themselves of another country's licens-
ing procedures via the requisite reciprocal agree-
Satellite Week, July 29, 1996 (stating that a industry member
comments MCI/News Corp. will need 3 million viewers to
break even because of the $682 million it paid for DBS li-
cense).
109 This goes back to the Commissions basic premise that
the radio spectrum is a scarce resource. Cable TV and tele-
phone regulations are premised on the concept that they are
natural monopolies along the lines of a public utility. See
generally Nonbroadcast Video, sup-a note 1 at §§ 3.01-3.06;
also Michael K. Kellogg, et al., Federal Telecommunications
Law 1-4 (1992); and see Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Telecom-
munications Law and Policy 343-46 (2d ed. 1998). The Com-
mission only licenses the use of the radio spectrum.
110 Concentration of control of DBS is not a new con-
cern, even before the service was authorized, commentators
expressed trepidation in placing the control of national
video in the hands of the few. See Satellite Communications/
Direct Broadcast Satellites Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecom., Consumer Protect., and Finance, 97th Cong. 97-81
(Testimony of Wallace J. Jorgenson, Representing MST and
the Three Television Network Affiliates Assoc.) (Dec. 15,
1981).
111 See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 400; and
NPRM, supra note 11 at para. 6.
112 The DBS service has three full-continental United
States "slots" internationally allocated with several others
than can only "see" part of the country (the satellite would be.
below the horizon of the earth for the rest of the country).
See Nonbroadcast Video, supra note 1 at § 15.01; and NPRM,
supra note 11 at para. 6.
113 See Comments of Primestar to In re Policies and Rules
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ments 1 4 and broadcast to the American
consumer. This effectively increases the spectrum
and orbital positions available to the domestic
market.115 While the effect is the creation of more
choices in the satellite MVPD market, it does not
enlarge the DBS resources available for licensing
by the Commission. 116
2. Refuting Scarcity with the Advancement of
Technology
A second argument against the presence of
scarcity in DBS is premised on the advancement
of technology creating additional MVPD me-
dia.' 17 In Turner Broadcasting, the Court applied
this argument to invalidate a cable television
"must carry" regulation.' 8 But the court spoke
only to cable content regulation and the potential
for technology to expand the capacity of cable sys-
tems to carry more "speakers."'1 19
for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at 11
(April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of Primestar]; and In re
Amendment to the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Al-
low Non-U.S. Licensed Spacecraft to Provide Domestic and
International Services in the United States, Report and Order,
(1997) [hereinafter DISCO I1]; see also NPRM, supra note 11 at
para. 12 (summarizing the foreign satellite policy). See In re
Amendment to the Commission's Regulatory Policies Gov-
erning Domestic Fixed Satellites and Separate International
Satellite Systems, Report and Order, II FCC Rcd. 2429 (1996).
114 See Agreement between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United
Mexican States Concerning the Transmission and Reception
from Satellites for the Provision of Satellite Services to Users
in the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, April 28, 1996; and Protocol Concerning the Trans-
mission and Reception of Signals from Satellites for the Pro-
vision of Direct-to-Home Satellite Services in the United
States and the United Mexican States, Public Notice, DA 96-
1880 (Nov. 13, 1996) (example agreement).
115 See In re Televisa International, LLC, Order and Author-
ization, 13 FCC Rcd. 10074 (1997) (authorizing the operation
of 1 million earth stations to receive video programming
from Mexico's Solaridad II satellite).
116 The utilization of foreign orbital positions is depen-
dent upon a favorable agreement with neighboring nations
and involves foreign policy decisions and subjects the owner
of a foreign-licensed satellite to the regulatory system of a for-
eign administration. See generally, DISCO II, supra note 113.
117 See Comments of Primestar, supra note 113 at 12-13;
and Comments of News Corp. to In re Policies and Rules for
the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at 6-8 (April
6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of News Corp.].
118 See Turner Broad. Co. v. FCC, 512 U.S. at 638-39. The
court stated that "[t]he broadcast cases are inapposite in the
present context because cable television does not suffer from
the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast me-
dium. Indeed, given the rapid advances in fiber optics and
digital compression technology, soon there may be no practi-
cal limitation on the number of speakers who may use the
DBS capacity has increased dramatically since
its 1982 inception when the average DBS satellite
only had the capacity to broadcast six channels. 120
Current DBS satellites broadcast at least six chan-
nels on each transponder with the current maxi-
mum capacity of a satellite equaling 32 transpon-
ders.121 Such technological advances make DBS
more attractive to consumers because the pro-
gram capacity is increased. 22 However, this ig-
nores the fundamental problem: the finite
amount of licenses and radio spectrum.123
C. A Blanket DBS Crossownership Prohibition
is an Arbitrary and Capricious Change in
the Policy Tide
When the Commission acts inconsistently with
its past action, it is subject to the possibility of a
legal challenge and judicial review.' 2 4 As the court
held in Greater Boston Television Corporation v.
cable medium. Nor is there any danger of physical interfer-
ence between two cable speakers attempting to share the
same channel." Id.
119 See id.
120 See Comments of Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. to In
re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Ser-
vice, FCC No. 98-26 at 2-3 (April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Com-
ments of Dominion Video]
121 See id. at 2-3; and see generally 1996 Hughes Annual Re-
port (stating that Hughes next generation satellite will double
the power of the most sophisticated satellite currently in or-
bit). The "magic" capacity increase was done through digital
compression and multiplexing (combining) of data streams
onto each transponder, with corresponding perfection of sat-
ellite construction techniques and larger satellite launch ve-
hicles. See Dawn Stover, Little Dish TV, POPULAR SCIENCE, Jan.
1, 1995 at 60 (discussing, in part, compression technology);
see also Nonbroadcast Video, supra note 1 at § 15.08.
122 See generally 1996 Hughes Annual Report. Like in Tur-
ner, the increased program capacity has enabled DBS to carry
more "speakers." See id.; and also Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512
U.S. at 638-39.
123 This argument also ignores the fact that it takes an
average of 3 years to get a satellite built and launched from
the day it is ordered, the extraordinary initial capital costs of
building and launching the spacecraft, and the length of
time the average DBS satellite is expected to remain in ser-
vice (about 10 years). See Comments of Dominion Video Sat-
ellite, supra note 120 at 5 (average lifespan and cost of a satel-
lite); see also EchoStar 1997 Annual Report at para. 9 (stating
that the construction and launch of the EchoStar IV satellite
$ 68 million U.S. dollars). EchoStar estimates the lifespan of
its four satellites at 12 years. See EchoStar Comm. Corp., 10-Q
Report at 8 (Aug. 8, 1998). This extended time frame, even
assuming that expanded capacity would remedy the scarcity
of spectrum, that any such remedy from increased satellite
capacity would arrive 10 years too late.
124 See WiLLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRA-
TIVqE LAw 416-18 (1997).
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FCC,125 judicial vigilance is called when the Com-
mission's policies are in flux because the Commis-
sion's view of the public interest may change with
or without a change in circumstances. 126
This argument is countered by the Commis-
sion's need and responsibility to re-evaluate its
regulatory standards on a regular basis. 12 7 The
Commission has the right to modify and overrule
long-standing precedents, though "such abrupt
shifts constitute 'danger signals' that the Commis-
sion may be acting inconsistently with its man-
date."' 28 When enacting a DBS/cable crossowner-
ship restriction, the Commission is required to
provide a reasoned analysis that must indicate
that prior policies and standards are being delib-
erately changed and not casually ignored. 129
Several commentators remark that the Commis-
sion would completely changing its policy by en-
acting a blanket DBS/cable crossownership prohi-
bition. 130 The argument is flawed on two regards.
The argument ignores the precedent of the
past 64 years of broadcast regulation andjurispru-
dence. 31 First, deregulation and regulatory flexi-
bility is still a relatively new concept in communi-
125 See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
126 See id. at 852.
127 See Office of Comm. of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
707 F.2d 1413, 1424-25 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding the
FCC's requirement to continue to impose "community issue"
programming on commercial radio, but eliminating the for-
mal ascertainment requirements). Since the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, the Commission is required to undertake
a biennial review of its regulations. See 47 U.S.C. § 161 (West
1998); and Commissioner Harold W. Furtchgott-Roth, Re-
port on Implementation of Section 11 by the Federal Com-
munications Commission (Dec. 21, 1998) (reporting mixed
results from the 1998 review, which was the first year of im-
plementation).
128 See id.
129 See id. at 1425. The court also indicates that the "rea-
soned analysis and factual bases" will be scrutinized closely
for assure that there is a rational and considered discussion
that is supported by the facts and law. Id. at 1426.
130 See Comments of the News Corp., supra note 117 at 3-
5.; Comments of Primestar, supra note 117 at 13-17; Com-
ments of Tempo Satellite to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in FCC 98-26 at 7 (April 12, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of
Tempo]; Comments of Time Warner Cable, supra note 60 at 2-7.
131 See notes and text, supra.
132 See LEON T. KNAUER, RONALD K. MACHTLEY AND
THOMAS M. LYNCH, TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT HANDBOOK at
61 (1996) (chronicling the rise of broadcast deregulation).
133 See Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.
1950). "The fact that a policy against monopoly has been
made the subject of criminal sanction by Congress does not
preclude an administrative agency charged with the public
interest from holding the general policy of Congress to be
cations regulation, having taken root in the 1970's
and advocated in the Telecommunications Act of
1996.132 Second, the Commission has long taken
antitrust concerns into its determination of the
public interest.1 33
While the Commission considered and rejected
crossownership restrictions on DBS in the past,134
it reserved the authority to impose them if a need
arose in the future. 135 Several commentators ar-
gued the 1982 DBS Order established Commission
precedent that ownership restrictions on the DBS
service were unnecessary. 136
1. The 1982 DBS Order: Precedent for the Rejection
of a Crossownership Prohibition
The situation faced by the Commission in the
1982 DBS Order was unique. DBS had not been
deployed so no evidence existed as to the viability
of the service with consumers or financiers.1 37
The Commission assumed that many alternative
video sources would be available by the time DBS
systems became operational,13 and ownership re-
strictions would limit the availability of service
applicable top questions arising in the proper discharge of its
duties... Monopoly in the mass communication of news and
advertising is contrary to the public interest, even if not in
terms proscribed by antitrust laws." Id. at 33; see also Serving
Two Masters, supra note 19 at 207 (citing U.S. v. FCC, 652 F.2d
72, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for the proposition that the FCC is
required to take antitrust considerations into its public inter-
est analysis).
134 See In re Revision of Rules and Policies for the Direct
Broadcast Satellite Service, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
9712 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 DBS Auction Order] (deciding
to adopt a single one-time rule prohibiting a person with an
attributable interest in channels at a full-CONUS orbital loca-
tion from acquiring channels in an auction).
135 See id. at para. 30. ("[b]alancing the competitive con-
cerns against the public interest concerns - such as the expe-
dition of service and allowing the market to maximize effi-
cient use of public resources - We [the Commission] believe
that the single, temporary structural rule... should be ade-
quate."); and 1982 DBS Order, supra note 2 at para. 98 (stating
that if the Commission's experience with the early DBS sys-
tems indicates that excessive concentration of control limits
access to information it will retain the option of imposing
ownership restrictions).
136 See Comments of Time Warner, supra note 60 at 3-4;
and In re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite
Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 6097, Com-
ments of the National Cable Television Association to In re
Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service,
FCC 98-26 at 5-7 (April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of
NCTA].
137 See note 2, supra.
138 See 1982 DBS Order, supra note 2 at para. 95. While
technically true, LMDS and SMATV has a minor percentage
[Vol. 7
Preserving the Public Interest
provided by the most experienced and capable
suppliers. 139 The Commission believed that an
ownership restriction would prevent DBS opera-
tors from assembling attractive program pack-
ages. 140 The Commission also assumed that the
penetration and ownership concentrations in the
cable industry would remain at 1982 levels be-
cause it stated that it would address concerns
about concentration of control on a locality by lo-
cality basis.1 4 1
The marketplace assumptions that underlie the
1982 DBS Order do not reflect the present day
competitive reality. First, heavy national concen-
tration of cable system ownership implicates con-
trol issues that span large aggregate blocks of ju-
risdictions, not just limited individual localities.1 42
Second, the 1992 Cable Act has removed the tele-
vision program access advantages that cable own-
ership was purported to bring to DBS. 143 As a re-
sult of the Cable Act, program suppliers are
forbidden to discriminate against DBS, so cable
operators and DBS systems have equal footing to
program acquisition. Third, the Commission did
not exclude enacting ownership restrictions: the
1982 DBS Order simply stated that it was not going
to institute an ownership control provision absent
a useful purpose.1 44
of the MVPD marketplace today, and while DBS is growing,
cable still dominates the field. This may change in the long
run, but the anti-competitive concerns exist now.
139 See 1982 DBS Order, supra note 2 at para. 97.
140 See id. at para. 97. The questions of program access
have been eliminated, at least in the eyes of the law, by the
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the 1992
Cable Act. However, program access violations still occur. See
generally In re Echostar Comm. Corp v. Fox/Liberty Networks,
Program Access Complaint, 13 FCC Rcd. 7394 (1998).
141 See 1982 DBS Order, supra note 2 at para. 98.
142 See 1997 Competition Report, supra note 1 at paras. 149-
56.
143 See generally In re Implementation of the Cable Televi-
sion Consumer Protect. and Competition Act of 1992, 10
FCC Rcd. 3105 (1994).
144 See id.
145 In re Revisions of Rules and Policies for the Direct
Broadcast Satellite Service, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd.
9712 (1995).
146 See id. at para. 73.
147 See id. The Commission also states that it has recog-
nized that cable-affiliated MVPD's bring "certain positive at-
tributes as DBS permittees." Id.
148 See id. at para. 72. The Commission also addresses the
fact that it may have figuratively already left door open for
cable in Tempo II. It states that "it is not necessary to reverse
Tempo II and exclude a cable-affiliated operator from the
opportunity to control or use DBS spectrum..." See id. at
2. The 1995 DBS Auction Order
Commentators use the Commission's decision
in the 1995 DBS Auction Order14 5 not to impose a
restriction on cable systems in a forthcoming DBS
auction as a rejection of all ownership restric-
tions. 146 In the Order, the Commission stated that
the presence of existing non-cable affiliated DBS
providers would severely constrain the strategic
activities of a DBS-MVPD combination because
consumers would have at least two other competi-
tive sources for DBS service.1 47 However, the
Commission also asserted that the non-aggrega-
tion rule it was adopting in the Auction Order elim-
inated the need for a separate restriction on non-
DBS multi-channel video program distributors. 148
D. The Commission has Evidence of a Need
for an Ownership Restriction
Some commentators argue that there is not
enough evidence to support a crossownership re-
striction. 149 The opposite is true. First, the video
program distribution markets will continue to be
highly concentrated. Second, cable system opera-
tors have a history of unfair practices. Third, pre-
para. 74. It notes Tempo/TCI's "substantial" investment in its
DBS system and makes a deference to that decision at least
partially attributable to reliance. Id. The Commission then
concludes that it will still have the power to grant, deny or
condition any proposed transactions in the event a non-DBS
MVPD attempts to acquire one of the existing and opera-
tional DBS systems at the other two full-CONUS positions at
1100 and 119' W.L. Id. at para. 76. The Commission seems to
have ignored the fact that in Tempo H that it severely condi-
tioned Tempo's authorization. See In reApplication of Tempo
Satellite, Inc. for the Construction Permit for New Direct
Broadcast Satellite System, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7
FCC Rcd. 2728 at para. 12 (1992). It also ignores the fact that
it stated that Tempo's participation in the DBS industry
could accelerate the initiation of DBS service. Id. at para. 10.
Allowing the unconditional entry of a non-MVPD operator in
the context of the 1995 auction proceedings does not logi-
cally flow from the heavily conditioned authorization granted
Tempo in the name of expediency. In Tempo II, the public
interest in "the best service" was clearly equal to encouraging
the initiation of service where there was none before. In
1995, with four, now three, operators broadcasting already,
the same cannot be said to be true. See supra note 1.
149 See Comments of Primestar, supra note 117 at 6-10;
and Comments of Tempo, supra note 130 at 7-8; see also Com-
ments of United States Satellite Brdcstng. Co. to In re Policies
and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-
26 at 7 (April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of USSB].
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dictions of anticompetitive behavior are enough
to justify crossownership restrictions.
1. The Video Program Distribution Market is and
will Continue to be Heavily Concentrated.
The cable industry has the largest share of sub-
scribers in the MVPD market. 150 The cable indus-
try continues to be vertically integrated' 51 with its
programming networks.' 52 Further, the cable in-
dustry continues to consolidate itself into regional
"clusters"' 53 of commonly owned cable systems in
geographic areas.' 154 The Commission expects this
trend to continue. 1 55 It describes the local MVPD
markets as "highly concentrated" and predicts
that there may be a tendency for prices to rise
above competitive levels and for product quality,
innovation, and services to fall below competitive
levels in both household and MDU (multiple
dwelling unit) MVPD markets.1 56 Cable prices
continue to rise 15 7 and non-cable MVPD's have in-
creased their number of subscribers but have not
150 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd. 6907, n.
2. The Commission cites the most recent video competition
report, which found that of the 73.6 million households in
the MVPD market, that 64.2 million were cable subscribers,
7.2 million were satellite subscribers of some form (DBS,
DTH-FSS and big-dish C-band), 1.1 million subscribed to
MMDS (wireless cable) systems, 1.2 million to SMATV and
3,000 subscribed to an "open video system." Id. (citing 1997
Competition Report, supra note 1 at Appendix E, Table E-1).
151 See DONALD RUTHERFORD, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
at 484 (1992). Vertical integration is "the joining together of
two or more stages of production." Id.
152 See 1997 Competition Report, supra note I at para 159.
Cable MSO's own 50% or more of 50 networks, 26 of the top
50 most viewed networks are vertically integrated, with 8 of
the top 15 prime-time rated networks vertically integrated.
See id. at paras. 159-60. New non-affiliated networks are being
created, but the barriers to success as an independent net-
work are high, with a high capital cost barrier and barriers to
entry. See id. at para. 165.
15- See 1997 Video Competition Report, supra note 1 at
para.140. Clustering is the consolidation of cable system own-
ership in a particular region. Id.
154 Now nearly 53 percent of the cable households in
America are in these clusters, up from 50 percent the last
year statistics were measured. See id. at para. 143.
155 See id. at para. 142.
156 See id. at para. 126.
157 See NPRM, supra note 11 at para. 1.
158 1997 Competition Report, supra note 1 at para. 128.
159 See Echostar Comm. Corp v. Rainbow Media Holdings, Inc.
and Rainbow Programming Holdings, Inc., FCC File No. CSR-
5127-P (complaint filed Oct. 14, 1997); and DirecTV v. Coin-
cast Corp., FCC File No. CSR-5112-P, DA 98-2151, 1998 W.L.
747904 (complaint filed Sept. 23, 1997); and In re Echostar
Comm. Corp v. Fox/Liberty Networks, Program Access Com-
plaint, FCC File No. CSR-5138-P, DA 98-2153 (Released Oct.
had a significant effect on cable subscribership.15
2. Cable System Operators Have a History of Unfair
Play.
Cable interests have a record of anticompetitive
conduct. 59 The cable system operators have used
their leverage as creators and distributors of video
programming to make market entry more diffi-
cult for competitors.
a. Primestar is an Example of Past Anti-
Competitive Behavior.
Five of the largest cable system operators own
sixty percent of Primestar, 160 a direct-to-home
video satellite service that operates in the domes-
tic satellite service161 (DOMSAT) bands. 162 In
1992, Primestar and its cable system owners/part-
ners were the subject of restraint of trade investi-
gations and consent decrees. 1 63 The decrees ex-
pired October 1, 1997, and Primestar is free
28, 1998); EchoStar Comm. Corp. v. Fox/Liberty Networks, LLC
and fX Networks, LLC, 13 FCC Rcd. 7394 (1998); cf Wizard
Program. Inc. v. Superstar/Netlink Group, 12 FCC Rcd. 22102
(1997) (complaining price discrimination against vertically
integrated cable-system owned program supplier); and Corpo-
rate Media Partners v. Rainbow Programming Holdings, Inc., 12
FCC Rcd. 15209 (1997) (MVPD charging price discrimination
against cable-owned program supplier); and cf Classic Sports
Network v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., File No. CSR-4975-P (rel. Dec.
24, 1997) (asserting that programmer-affiliated systems would
only allow vertically-integrated programs on system).
160 See Leslie Cauley and John Lippman, "News Corp.
and an Affiliate of TCI Set Tentative Accord to Control
Primestar," WALL ST.J. (Sept. 8 1998) at B3 (chronicling the
News Corp and TCI Satellite Entertainment's proposed buy-
out of Primestar). Primestar was originally formed as "K-
Prime" entertainment. Primestar's service is transmitted in a
manner similar to the current DBS systems, but with a satel-
lite that uses less power. Time Warner, MediaOne Group,
Cox Communications, Comcast and TCI Satellite Entertain-
ment are among Primestar's biggest shareholders. Primestar
is owned by G.E. Americom, Comcast, Continental Cablevi-
sion, Cox Communications, Tele-communications, Inc., New-
house Broadcasting and Time-Warner.
161 See RICHARD WEINER, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIC-
TIONARY OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS (1996). The domes-
tic satellite service transmits primarily for in-country use.
162 See 1995 DBS Auction Order, supra note 134 at para.
41; United States Satellite Broadcasting Co. Quarterly Report
(Dec. 31, 1997). Primestar operates in the Fixed Satellite Ser-
vice ("FSS") band with a medium-power satellite that requires
larger 3-foot satellite dishes (contrast EchoStar, USSB and
DirecTV use of 18-inch antennas). The programming is simi-
lar to that of EchoStar, USSB/DirecTV and cable. Like cable,
but unlike DirecTV/USSB and EchoStar, Primestar leases its
equipment to consumers. Id.
163 See New York v. Primestar Partners, L.P., 1993-2 Trade
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under the decree to become a high-power DBS
operator, investor, or licensee after it gives 45 days
notice to the states. 164
While the Primestar decrees and program access
complaints are not directly part of the record in
the NPRM, the Commission maintains authority
to take into account its experience of a cable op-
erator's past actions when it makes decisions
based on predicted conduct.
b. Predictions of Economic Misbehavior Justify a
Crossownership Prohibition.
The Commission can institute a crossownership
prohibition if it anticipates that anticompetitive
behavior may occur. In upholding the LMDS/
cable crossownership ban in Melcher v. FCC,1 65 the
court asserted that a complete and factual support
in the record is required when the Commission
establishes criteria based on predictions of market
and regulated entities behavior.' 66  However,
when factual certainties do not exist or do not
provide the answer, the Commission is only re-
quired to state and identify the considerations
that it found persuasive.1 67 In Melcher, the Com-
mission's considerations were not limited to the
Cas. (CCH) P70,404 (1993); and New York v. Primestar, 1993-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) P70,403 (1993). The cases followed a five-
year investigation and alleged that the cable system owner-
partners and Primestar stifled competition from non-cable
operators and attempted to suppress the development of
DBS technology as a competitor to cable service. See LMDS
Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 12545 at paras. 166-67, see also David J.
Saylor, Programming Access and Other Competition Regulations of
the Television Law and the Primestar Decrees: A Guided Tour
Through the Maze, 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321
(1994) (offering a summary and analysis of the Primestar de-
crees).
164 * See id. at 369-70.
165 SeeMelcherv. FCC, 134 F.3d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (up-
holding LMDS/Cable cross-ownership prohibition).
166 See id. at 1156.
167 See id.
168 See id. at 1155-57.
169 See id. (quoting the LMDS Order, supra note 44 at
para. 179).
170 See Melcher v. FCC, 134 F.3d at 1157.
171 See LMDS Order, supra note 46 at para. 174, n. 267 (cit-
ing multiple sources on preemption).
172 See id.
173 Comments of DirecTV, Inc. to In re Policies and
Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at
3-4 (Apr. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of DirecTV]; and
Comments of Tempo Satellite, supra note 130 at 7 (Apr. 6,
1998) (Citing the LMDS Order, supra note 46 at para. 171).
174 Time Warner Cable refutes this by pointing out that
"the Commission envisions the cable/LMDS cross-ownership
formal record in the LMDS proceedings. 168 For
example, the Commission relied on standard eco-
nomic theory, its experience, analogous situations
in the cable industry, and an assessment of com-
petitive and regulatory developments in the local
telephony and MVPD markets. 169
From these criteria the Commission concluded
that an LMDS license's value would be of its po-
tential to preserve profits that a non-cable com-
petitor would erode. 170 The Melcher court was in-
fluenced by the Commission's application of
economic theory171 when it found the Commis-
sion's predictions reasonable and with adequate
support. 172
Commenting on the NPRM, DirecTV notes that
the Commission found in the LMDS Order that a
cable LMDS licensee would have the incentive to
protect its market power and DirecTV believes
that the same motives exist in DBS. 173 This rea-
soning is sound because the economic arguments
in LMDS should be even more applicable to
DBS. 174 Concentration of ownership and the eco-
nomic theories of competitive behavior 175 should
be even more persuasive because a cable interest
would be able to gain national coverage with the
acquisition of a single license.
band as a short-term, three year restriction intended to pro-
tect LMDS during its infancy." Reply Comments of Time
Warner, supra note 63 at 8. While this may be a correct char-
acterization of the application and purpose of the rule, it
does not address the issue at hand: whether the Commission
could promulgate a cross-ownership prohibition on the basis
of economic predictions of possible anti-competitive behav-
ior.
175 See generally DOUGLASS NEEDHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE at 159-
183 (1978). Economists studying the dynamics of business
competition and business behavior have developed pertinent
mathematical and theoretical models. These models include
an analysis of the existence of barriers to market entry and
attempt to predict the effect on potential market entrants. See
id. at 1-25; INGEMAR DIERCKX AND KAREN COOL, Competitive
Strategy, Asset Accumulation and Firm Performance, STRATEGIC
GROUPS, STRATEGIC MOVES AND PERFORMANCE at 63-79 (Her-
man Daems and Howard Thomas, ed. 1994). The economist
can model and predict the likely conduct and performance
of a particular company and the particular strategies it might
choose. See generally Tracy R. Lewis, Preemption, Divestiture, and
Forward Contracting in a Market Dominated by a Single Firm, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 1092-1101 (Dec. 1983); Marvin B.
Leiberman, Excess Capacity as a Barrier to Entry: An Empirical
Appraisal, 35 JOUR. INDUS. ECON. 607-627 (June 1987). The
theory of preemption posits that a heavily concentrated mar-
ket will continue to stay heavily concentrated because the ad-
vantages of incumbency grow over time and form a strong
barrier to market entry by a competitor.
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II. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS AS A PUBLIC
INTEREST SAFEGUARD
Having stated that the Commission has the au-
thority to affect a blanket crossownership prohibi-
tion, it is unlikely that the Commission would de-
cide to maintain the status quo. 1 76 The decision to
address competition concerns ad hoc would argua-
bly be against the public interest unless the argu-
ment stands that the service is still developing. 177
The general consensus of the commentators178
is best summarized by DirecTV which stated that
"a per se cable/DBS crossownership ban is a harsh
measure inconsistent with the flexibility that has
characterized DBS service regulation." ' 7
DirecTV's position is that as the MVPD market be-
comes more competitive, cable-DBS affiliations
will not pose the competition concerns that exist
now. '
80
A. Precedent and Advantages of a Case-by-case
Analysis
DirecTV's statement that cable participation in
DBS may be welcome at some point in the future
is logical. First, when the Commission condition-
ally authorized cable operator TCI's affiliate
Tempo Satellite in the Tempo II decision, 18' it
stated that MVPD experience and resources
would be helpful in the initiation and launch of
the first DBS services. Secondly, the Commission
has stated that it prefers addressing DBS competi-
tion on a case-by-case basis with a reliance on ex-
isting antitrust law, although it has never pre-
cluded a blanket ownership prohibition. 182
176 Many of the commentators in the proceeding have
stated that some form of action is needed. DirecTV states
that Congress specifically called upon the Commission to ex-
ercise its existing authority to adopt ownership limitations
should it be determined they would serve the public interest.
Comments of DirecTV, supra note 173 at 9.
177 Query, however, that it would ever be likely for a deci-
sion to continue with an informal analysis to be overturned
upon judicial review. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
The Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee has expressly tied the
judiciary from imposing any new procedural requirements
on an administrative body.
178 See Comments of BellSouth Corp., BellSouth Interac-
tive Media Serv., Inc. and BellSouth Wireless Cable, Inc. to In
re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcasting Service, FCC
98-26 at 3 (April 6, 1998); Comments of DirecTV, supra note
173 at 11; Comments of the Office of Communication,
United Church of Christ and Consumer's Union to In re Poli-
cies and Rules for the Direct Broadcasting Service, FCC 98-26
at 3 (April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of UCC].
1. TEMPO H
The Commission in Tempo II approved a condi-
tioned operation authorization for TCI-controlled
Tempo Satellite.'8 3 In that proceeding, the Com-
mission stated that existing antitrust law, in com-
bination with the conditions it imposed in the Or-
der would be adequate to prevent any anti-
competitive conduct by Tempo. 18 4 The Commis-
sion also stated that in 1990 it recommended that
Congress reaffirm the applicability of traditional
antitrust principals to DBS and the obligation of
firms to avoid interference with emerging compe-
tition.185
2. 1995 DBS Auction Order
In its 1995 DBS Auction Order, the Commission
disagreed that the public interest is furthered by
freezing the structure of the DBS industry with a
blanket crossownership prohibition. 8 6 It believed
that the adopted Orderwould leave it free to evalu-
ate future transactions on a case-by-case basis.'i 7
In addition, the Commission noted that it would
continue to have rulemaking authority to remedy
anti-competitive conduct and consider additional
rules, if required.'88 The FCC also noted that the
presence of DirecTV, EchoStar, and USSB would
constrain a cable/DBS combination because con-
sumers could still choose two other competitive
DBS sources.'8 9 In a nod to Tempo II, the Commis-
sion recognized that cable-affiliated MVPDs bring
certain positive attributes as DBS permittees. 190
The Commission's expressed preference of a
case-by-case approach to DBS crossownership is
179 See Comments of DirecTV, supra note 173 at 3-4.
180 Id. at 11. See also Reply Comments of United States
Satellite Brdcstng. Co., Inc. to In re Policies and Rules for the
Direct Broadcasting Service, FCC 98-26 at 2 (April 21, 1998)
[hereinafter Reply Comments of USSB].
181 See In re Application of Tempo Satellite, Inc. for Con-
struction Permit for New Direct Broadcast Satellite System, 7
FCC Rcd. 2728 (1992) [hereinafter Tempo 1].
182 See id. at para. 3.
183 See id. at para. 1
184 See id.
185 Id. (citing the 1990 Cable Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 4962,
5031 (1990).
186 See 1995 Auction Order at para. 31.
187 See id.
188 Id.; See also id. at para. 76.
189 See 1995 DBS Auction Order, supra note 134 at para. 73.
190 See id. at para. 73-74. Query whether these positive at-
tributes come mostly from the heavy vertical integration of
the cable and programming industries.
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not enough to continue an ad hoc policy. An ad-
ministrative law case-by-case approach suffers
from the same vagaries of the common law - it is
inherently unpredictable and inconsistent. 91 A
case-by-case approach also subjects each proceed-
ing to the possibility that any particular transac-
tion's concept of the public interest will vary ac-
cording to the political tide. 192
B. Adopting a Formal Antitrust Analysis
In the 1990's, the Commission began to adopt a
competitive analysis framework based on the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and Department of Jus-
tice's 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 193 The
Commission primarily used this analysis in com-
mon carrier contexts. 19 4 However, the Interna-
tional Bureau' 95 has since adopted the analysis in
the context of satellite regulation in the 1998 Ar-
dis Order.196
191 See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 290
(1960) (stating in dicta that a case by case approach may not
satisfy an academic's desire for neatness).
192 Several commentators note that Commissioners Pow-
ell and Furtchgott-Roth assert a reliance on the Department
of Justice's antitrust enforcement powers. See Comments of
NCTA, supra note 136 at 4; see also Comments of Time
Warner Cable, supra note 80 at 9; See also In re Policies and
Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, Separate Statement of Commissioner Har-
old W. Furtchgott-Roth Dissenting, 13 FCC Rcd. 6907 (rel.
Feb. 26, 1998); and In re Policies and Rules for the Direct
Broadcast Satellite Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Sepa-
rate Statement of Commissioner Michael K. Powell Approv-
ing in Part, Dissenting in Part, 13 FCC Rcd. 6907 (rel. Feb.
26, 1998). This would be an abdication of the Commission's
duty to regulate in the public interest. In Applications of Tele-
communications, Inc. and Liberty Media the Commission re-
jected a reliance on the Commission's cable program car-
riage regulations to protect consumers from anti-competitive
behavior. It felt that the reliance on a series of case by case
decisions would prevent the Commission from getting a
"clear picture" of the market structure and the public inter-
est as a whole. See In re Telecommunications, Inc. and Liberty
Media Corp., Applications for Transfer of Control of Radio
Licenses, 9 FCC Rcd. 4783 at para. 21 (1994) (stating that it is
"well settled" that the public interest means the public as a
whole). That would be the case here also, because a reliance
on the Department of Justice to address competition issues
would prevent the Commission from getting the whole pic-
ture, let alone a quick glimpse of the statue of the market-
place.
193 See In re Applications of NYNEX Corp. and Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. for Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corp.
and its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC
Rcd. 19985 at para. 37 (1997) (hereinafter Bell Atlantic/
NYNEX Order); and Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Com-
mission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep
(CCH) 13,104 (1992), 57 FR 41, 552 (Sept. 10, 1992), 1992
FTC LEXIS 176 (1992) (hereinafter 1992 Merger Guidelines).
The analysis compares the before and after ef-
fects of the transaction on competition. 197 The
Commission takes considers any beneficial effi-
ciencies of the transaction along with any other
public interest benefits that are likely to result.' 98
It relies heavily on the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines while incorporating the Commission's
independent expertise. 199 The Commission's
analysis departs from that of the Department of
Justice in that in incorporates decades of Commis-
sion experience in telecommunications market
competition. 200
The analysis first begins with the definition of
the relevant markets, both geographic 201 and
product.20 2 Second, current and potential partici-
pants are identified in these markets20 3 and, third,
the effects that the transaction may have on the
relevant markets are evaluated.20 4 Fourth, the
analysis considers whether the transaction will
have any harmful or beneficial effects, by weigh-
194 See LMDS Order, supra note 46 at para. 37, n. 88.
While the Commission has used the analysis primarily in a
common carrier (telephone and long distance carrier) con-
text, however, it was also used in the LMDS Order.
195 One of 5 divisions of the FCC, responsible for all sat-
ellite services and international telecommunications regula-
tion.
196 See In re Application of Motorola, Inc. and American
Mobile Satellite Corp. for Consent to Transfer Control of Ar-
dis Co., 13 FCC Rcd. 5182 (1998)[hereinafter Ardis Order].
In this proceeding commentators Ameritech urged the Com-
mission to adopt this analysis. Comments of Ameritech to In
re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Ser-
vice, FCC 98-26 at 5-14 (April 6, 1998).
197 See Ardis Order, supra note 196 at para. 9
198 See id. In the 1992 Merger Guidelines, the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission stated that the
Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the
larger universe of mergers that are either competitively bene-
ficial or neutral while challenging competitively harmful
mergers. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 191 at § 0.1.
199 While the analysis is heavily based on the 1992 Merger
Guidelines, the Commission's function is to enforce the stan-
dard of the public, interest, convenience and necessity and
has the duty to refuse licenses or renewals to those that will
engage in or propose to engage in actions that will prevent
the full use of the licensed facilities. See In re Telecommunica-
tions, Inc. and Liberty Media Corp., Applications for Consent to
Transfer Control of Radio Licenses, 9 FCC Rcd. 4783 at para. 18
(1994) (stating that it is not the function of the FCC to en-
force the antitrust laws "as such").
200 See Ardis Order, supra note 196 at para. 10.
201 See id. at para. 11; and 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 193 at § 1.2.
202 See Ardis Order, supra note 196 at para. 11; and 1992
Merger Guidelines, supra note 193 at § 1.1.
203 See Ardis Order, supra note 196 at para. 12; and 1992
Merger Guidelines, supra note 193 at §§ 1.3-1.5.
204 See Ardis Order, supra note 196 at para. 14; and 1992
Merger Guidelines, supra note 193 at §§ 2.0-2.2.
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ing these effects to determine whether the overall
effect is to enhance competition. 20 5
Applying this analysis in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
Order,20 6 the Commission has stated that appli-
cants carry the burden of showing that the pro-
posed merger would not eliminate potentially sig-
nificant sources of competition that the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, sought
to create. 20 7 Thus, a party must prove that the
transaction will enhance and promote competi-
tion, rather than prove the competition will not
be eliminated or retarded.208
1. Relevant Geographic and Product Markets
In the case of DBS, the matters of geographic
and product markets20 9 have been well settled.
The 1995 Auction Order, the 1997 Competition Re-
port, the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the par-
ties' comments and reply comments are in agree-
ment.2 10 The relevant product markets is the
MVPD market and the relevant geographic mar-
ket is the nation as a whole. 211
205 See Ardis Order, supra note 196 at para. 16; see also,
1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 193 at §§ 2.0-2.2 & 4; and
Revision to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines Issued by the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 1997 FTC
LEXIS 283 (April 8, 1998) at § 4 (hereinafter 1997 Guideline
Revision).
206 See Bell Atlantic/Nynex Order, supra note 193.
207 See id.
208 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at para.
3. The Commission concludes that both Bell Atlantic and
NYNEX were potential competitors, and was prepared to de-
cline the application for merger. However, the parties agreed
to voluntary undertake "a series of commitments" that would
condition the approval of the merger. Id. at paras. 7-12.
209 The 1992 Merger Guidelines note that a merger is un-
likely to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its
exercise unless it significantly increases concentration and re-
suits in a concentrated market. Mergers that neither signifi-
cantly increase concentration nor result in a concentrated
market ordinarily require no further analysis. 1992 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 193 at § 1.0.
210 See Comments of Ameritech to In re Policies and
Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at
8 (April 6, 1998); and Comments of DirecTV, supra note 173
at 6-7; Comments of EchoStar Communications Corp. to In re
Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service,
FCC 98-26 at 6 (April 6, 1998) [hereinafter Comments of EchoS-
tar]; Comments of the NCTA, supra note 136 at 9; but c.f
Comments of the Wireless Cable Association to In re Policies
and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-
26 at 5 (April 6, 1998).
211 Query whether this definition includes the non-con-
tiguous Unites States. In this same proceeding, one of the
other contested proposals was to strengthen requirements
that DBS operators serve Alaska and Hawaii. Both states com-
ment that they do not receive the DBS service and are not
2. Competition Under the Analysis: Actual and
Potential
A discussion of the current and potential com-
petitors is less straightforward than a discussion of
the relevant market shares. Broadly defining the
entire MVPD market includes all of the actual ex-
isting participants in the market. The analysis also
requires for the consideration of any potential
competitors. Traditional antitrust theory uses the
concept of actual potential competitors to ex-
amine the potential effects of the transaction. 212
The 1992 Merger Guidelines use a quantitative
analysis under the potential competition doc-
trine. 213 In the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, the
Commission accepted the doctrine as a tool of
general application but warned that it will not
bound by it when it uses its own analysis devel-
oped through years of experience with telecom-
munications competition policy.2 14 The Commis-
sion rejected the application of the actual
potential competitor doctrine as it is applied, to
its public interest analysis. 215
likely to in the future. See Comments of the State of Alaska to
In re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Ser-
vice, FCC 98-26 (April 6, 1998); and Comments of the State
of Hawaii to In re Policies and Rules for the Direct Broadcast
Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 (April 6, 1998) This is due to
technical constraints. The orbital position of the satellite dic-
tates how much of the country can be "viewed" by the satel-
lite. After a distance, the curvature of the earth causes some
places to be below the horizon of the satellite. In the case of
Alaska and Hawaii, their distance from the mainland places
those states past the horizon of the CONUS orbital positions.
See id.; and 47 C.F.R. § 100.53 (1998).
212 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at 138.
213 See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 193 at § 1.5. The
doctrine asks five questions. First, whether the market is
highly concentrated. See 5 PI-IILLIP AREEDA AND DONALD F.
TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PALS AND THEIR APPLICATION 1119 (1980 & Supp.
1997) [hereinafter Antitrust Law]. Second, the doctrine ana-
lyzes whether the few other potential entrants are equivalent
to the company that proposes to enter the market by merger.
Third, the doctrine asks whether "but for" the merger the
company would have been reasonably likely to enter the mar-
ket in absence of the merger. Fourth, the analysis asks
whether the merging company would have had another feasi-
ble means of entry. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 193
at § 3; and Antitrust Law, supra at 1124. Finally the analysis
considers whether the other alternative means of entry would
have had a substantial likelihood of producing market de-
concentration or other pro-competitive effects. See Bell Atlan-
tic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at para. 138
214 See id. at para. 136.
215 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at para.
139 (stating that because the Commission is determining
whether Bell Atlantic has carried the burden of demonstrating
that the merger is in the public interest as opposed to violat-
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3. Potential Benefits and Harms of a Transaction.
The Commission's analysis of the potential
harms of the transaction also includes an analysis
of the potential benefits. 2 1 6 According to the 1992
Merger Guidelines, an agency should consider only
efficiencies that would unlikely occur absent the
transaction. 217 These efficiencies must also be
weighed against the potential harms and the ben-
efits to the public interest must increase as the
harms to the public become greater and more
certain.218
The benefits of cable ownership of DBS are not
clear. There is no evidence that reduced prices
will devolve to the consumer. It is quite possible
that a cable interest would use leverage derived
from market concentration and a DBS license to
achieve an advantage against the existing compet-
itors. Cable rates after deregulation have risen
and there is no reason to believe that they will de-
crease after cable entry into DBS.
It is also unlikely that a cable-affiliated licensee
would bring competitive benefits that another
market entrant could not. Although faced in the
1995 DBS Action Order with ambiguous evidence of
the effects of cable participation, the Commission
rejected the imposition of cable/DBS restric-
tion.2 1 9 Under this analysis, a cable applicant's
DBS license would be denied unless it could
demonstrate concrete pro-competitive results.
C. Advantages of the Bell Atlantic/Nynex
Analysis.
1. The Analysis is not Over or Under-Inclusive.
The analysis has many advantages. First it is not
over-inclusive. It weeds out the potentially harm-
ful transactions while permitting the beneficial
transactions. 220 Financing available to the DBS in-
dustry would only be limited by excluding transac-
tions that would most likely result in anti-competi-
tive behavior. 221 Transactions involving a cable
interest with a minor national market share would
still move forward and allow DBS access to greater
financial resources and provide a cable entity the
opportunity to compete against larger MVPD enti-
ties.
The use of this heightened transaction analysis
also avoids the potential of future under-inclusive-
ness. While cable interests will maintain an over-
whelming percentage of the MVPD market into
the foreseeable future, 222 it would be a futile exer-
cise to predict that future technological develop-
ments will not eliminate or significantly reduce
cable's dominance. If cable is replaced by a new
dominant technology, it is not impossible to imag-
ine that the new technological giant would pose
the problems and raise the same issues that cable
participation in DBS currently presents.
ing the antitrust laws, it will not address whether the record
establishes a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and so
it does not need to conduct an analysis under the doctrine).
James R. Weiss and Martin L. Stern described the Commis-
sions approach to antitrust analysis in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX
Order as lip service. See Serving Two Masters, supra note 120 at
203.
216 See Ardis Order, supra note 194 at para. 68; and Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at 157. This includes
the efficiencies that would result from the merger. The 1992
Merger Guidelines state that the primary benefit of mergers to
the economy is their potential to enhance efficiency, increase
the competitiveness of firms and result in lower prices to con-
sumers. 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 193 at § 4. In the
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order the Commission stated that "effi-
ciencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near
monopoly." Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at para.
159.
217 See 1997 Guideline Revision, supra note 205 at § 4.
218 See Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 193 at para.
157.
219 See 1995 Auction Order, supra note 134 at paras. 27 &
75.
220 The nature of the Commission's application of this
analysis in balancing the current and future benefits of a par-
ticular transaction allows marginally beneficial transactions
to move forward, as long as the Commission foresees market
and technological change. See Serving Two Masters, supra note
20 at 207-208 (commenting on the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Or-
der's application of this analysis in approving the Bell Atlantic/
Nynex merger).
221 See Comments of News Corp., supra note 117 at 8-10;
and Comments of PanAmSat to In re Policies and Rules for
the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at 6 (Apr. 6,
1998).
222 This is for the myriad of reasons that cable and DBS/
direct-to-home satellite differ: antenna size and "view" restric-
tions, atmospheric conditions, the existing installed base,
lack of local channels and the initial expense of equipment
and installation.
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2. The Least Intrusive Option
This analysis also is the least intrusive of the op-
tions available to the Commission.2 23 It does not
disturb the current ownership relationships or
pose an absolute barrier to market entry at a fu-
ture date. The Primestar applications are still pend-
ing before the Commission. Under this analysis
they would likely not be granted. However, it
would not call for the divestiture of Tempo's au-
thorization because the competitive concerns in
that proceeding were addressed and remedied by
the imposition of conditions on the grant of au-
thorization. 224
3. Preserves the Ability of the DBS Industry to Adapt
to Change
This formal analysis preserves both the indus-
try's ability to respond to change and the Com-
mission's ability to review future transactions on a
case-by-case basis.225 The development of DBS
has demonstrated that the industry has benefited
from regulatory flexibility. 226 Regulatory flexibility
allowed DBS operators to develop and implement
preferential technical specifications. DBS service
evolved into a strong competitor to cable because
if the operators had been bound by FCC stan-
223 See 1995 Auction Order, supra note 134 at para. 65. The
Commission states that "[w]e share many commenter's [sic]
reluctance for regulation of the DBS service, which is why we
have sought to implement the least intrusive means possible
to further the goals articulated above of fostering competitive
rivalry among MVPD's." Id. This is not to say that there are
not costs involved. A party to a particular transaction must
incur costs to apply for Commission approval, respond to
public comments and undergo significant document produc-
tion. See Serving Two Masters, supra note 20 at 206.
224 See Tempo II, supra note 181 at para. 12. The situation
in the Primestar applications poses more serious concerns
than that in Tempo I. Where Tempo's major MVPD share-
holder was TCI Satellite Entertainment ("TCI-SAT"), Primes-
tar is held collectively by five of the major cable system opera-
tors. Any anti- competitive conduct by Tempo would involve
only one of the major cable system operators, where the con-
duct of Primestar would involve a collective of the five biggest
operators who aggregately control over 50 percent of the
cable market.
225 See id. Commissioners Furtchgott-Roth and Powell in
their partial dissents to the NPRM expressed concerns that a
blanket prohibition would sacrifice the flexibility that charac-
terized DBS in the past, and would completely ignore a less
regulatory approach. See In re Policies and Rules for the Di-
rect Broadcast Satellite Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furtchgott-
Roth Dissenting, 13 FCC Rcd. 6907 (1998); and In re Policies
and Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Separate Statement of Commissioner
dards promulgated at the service's inception, DBS
would have been forced into system designs with
less channel capacity based on 1980's technol-
ogy.2 2 7 While concrete benefits of MVPD partici-
pation in DBS are far from certain, such presci-
ence was not required during the inception of
DBS.
4. Less Serious DBS Competitive Concerns Can Be
Addressed Through Conditional Licensing
If the competitive concerns raised in a particu-
lar case are not serious enough to warrant the de-
nial of a license under the analysis, the Commis-
sion can make a conditional grant as it did in Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX and TEMPO 11.228 The public in-
terest would be assured not only by the use of the
analysis, but also by conditional licensing. The
availability of two regulatory tools assures that a
party seeking a DBS license transfer or authoriza-
tion will be bound to a specific agreement to serve
the public interest.
5. The Analysis Adds Predictability and Consistency
The Commission acknowledged in its NPRM
that predictability and consistency in DBS owner-
Michael K. Powell Approving in Part, Dissenting in Part, 13
FCC Rcd. 6907 (1998) (stating that competitive concerns ex-
ist and should be addressed in a separate proceeding).
In testimony to Congress following Commission approval
of the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger, then-Chairman Reed
Hundt said that the application of this analysis to that trans-
action was a landmark decision in describing a detailed flexi-
ble public interest analysis. See Serving Two Masters, supra note
20 at 203 (citing The Telecommunications Act: An Antitrust Per-
spective: Testimony of Reed Hundt, Chairman, FCC, Testimony
Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business
Rights and Competition, Sept. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Cngtst file).
226 See Comments of Tempo Satellite, supra note 130 at 3;
and Comments of Primestar, supra note 117 at 20; and Com-
ments of DirecTV, supra note 173 at 27; c.f EchoStar Quarterly
Report (stating that the FCC has typically shown flexibility
when satellite failures occur).
227 See Reply Comments of Primestar to In re Policies and
Rules for the Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FCC 98-26 at
11-12 (April 21, 1998); Reply Comments of EchoStar, supra
note 63 at 11-12.
228 The Commission also imposed conditions when MCI
applied for Commission of its proposed merger with British
Telecom, a transaction that was not consummated for other
reasons. See Serving Two Masters, supra note 19 at 204 (citing
In re The Merger of MCI Comm. Corp. and British
Telecomms. PLC, 12 FCC Rcd. 3460 (1997); Proposed Final
Judgement and Memorandum in Support of Modification, 2
Fed. Reg. 37594 (1997)).
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Preserving the Public Interest
ship qualifications offers some desirability. 229 The
Commission has been criticized for inconsistent
application of economic principles and analy-
sis.230 Critics have targeted the Commissions un-
willingness to use a principled analysis in some sit-
uations where policy would not be furthered by its
application. 23 1 This analysis rejects some of the
doctrines present in the Department of Justice's
Merger Guidelines2 32 but it does offer the affected
parties a more concrete guide in predicting how
the Commission may rule in any particular pro-
ceeding.
III. CONCLUSION
The Commission should adopt a formal anti-
trust analysis when it approaches DBS crossowner-
ship issues. A published, structured analysis offers
229 See NPRM, supra note 11 at para. 58.
230 See generally, Warren G. Lavey, Inconsistencies in Appli-
cations of Economics at the Federal Communications Commission,
45 FED. COM. L.J. 437 (Aug. 1993).
participants and the public a concrete guideline
that creates more predictable results than a pure
ad hoc approach. Unlike a blanket rule prohibit-
ing cable ownership of DBS, it offers the industry
continued flexibility in financing and the ability
to form strategic relationships offsetting the costs
of implementing a DBS system. At the same time,
it preserves the public's interest in affordable,
competitive multi-channel video programming. It
is an effective compromise, and a logical exten-
sion of Commission policy and the deregulatory
spirit of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that
will reach into the homes of every American con-
sumer. As Commission Chairman Hundt de-
scribed the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, this analysis
offers the still-evolving DBS service a "flexible and
dynamic approach to industry structure."233
231 See id. at 460-88.
232 See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra note 193.
233 See Serving Two Masters, supra note 20 at 203.
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